The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies, The Policing of Protest in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing by FILLIEULE, Olivier & JOBARD, Fabien
Robert Schuman Centre
The Policing of Mass Demonstration 
in Contemporary Democracies
The Policing of Protest in France: 




























































































































































































EUI Working Paper RSC No. 97/4
Fillieule/Jobard: The Policing of Mass Demonstration 
in Contemporary Democracies 
The Policing of Protest in France: 



























































































The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council o f  the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 




























































































E U R O P E A N  U N IV E R S IT Y  IN S T IT U T E , F L O R E N C E
R O B E R T  S C H U M A N  C E N T R E
The Policing o f M ass D em onstration  
in C ontem porary D em ocracies
T h e  P o lic in g  o f  P ro tes t  in  F ra n ce :  




A Working Paper written for the Conference organised by the RSC 
on The Policing o f Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies 
held at the EUI the 13-14 October 1995, 
directed by Donatella della Porta and Yves M6ny
E U I W orking Paper R S C  N o . 9 7 /4  



























































































A ll rights reserved.
N o  part o f  this paper m ay be reproduced in any form  
w ithout perm ission o f  the authors.
© O liv ier  F illieu le  and Fabien Jobard 
Printed in Italy in January 1997  
European U niversity  Institute 
B ad ia  F ieso lana  




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
In Demonstration Democracy (1970) Amitai Etzioni stated that the 
recourse to direct expression of opinion through protest was becoming an 
increasingly common practice in democratic countries. According to Etzioni, this 
was noticeable both in the rise in the number of demonstrations and in the 
spread of this practice to all levels of society. This established analysis is in line 
with the French situation of the eighties and the nineties. In fact, the legitimacy 
of protest is now well recognized by French public opinion. Its use is 
widespread among all socio-professional categories (Fillieule, 1994) and the 
legal framework has developed to extent that the right to protest is now 
considered a constitutional right.1 Furthermore, demonstrations rarely give way 
to the use of violence on the part of demonstrators or the forces of law and 
order. Studies conducted by Favre and Fillieule have in fact shown that only 5 
per cent of demonstrations become violent in the form of destruction of 
public/private property or attacks on other persons (Favre, 1990; Favre and 
Fillieule, 1994).2
These observations strongly suggests that demonstrating has becoming a 
usual and peaceful process in France, which therefore places it among the broad 
range of conventional political practices. Thus, the common image of the police 
battling with demonstrators has become rather misleading. Disorder is largest 
rare, even in the biggest and most problematic protest events. By and large, 
demonstrators cooperate with the police, assemble at a previously agreed upon 
location, proceed along an agreed route and disperse peacefully, regardless of 
the perceived results of their action.
Thus, the issue to address is how the police have extended such a high degree 
of control over protest action by cooperation with demonstrators rather than by
1 Cf. Constitutional Court, n°94-352 DC 01/18/1995 and Favre (1993).
2 The French national police have developed a very broad definition of a protest event. 
A protest event, for them, includes any type of gathering of people, either in public or private. 
Hence, included in the term are events as diverse as soccer matches, rock concerts, Labour 
Day parades, religious processions and, from time to time, picket lines. For both practical and 
theoretical reasons which we cannott go into within the space of this paper, we will not go 
into here, we define a protest event much more narrowly, as follows: an event in which a non­
governmental actor occupies a public space (public buildings, streets) in order to make a 
political demand, to experience in-process benefits, or to celebrate something, which includes 
the manifest or latent expression o f political opinion. For a further explanation on the 



























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
repression. How is the policing of protests organized in France? On what 
principles and professional knowledge is it based? These are some of the 
questions which this paper will deal with.
The theoretical significance of these issues is not simply confined to 
sociological studies of the police. In its broader framework, studies of the 
maintenance of law and order should become one of the central elements of the 
analysis of social movements. Indeed, the development of social movements 
depends largely on the State’s structures and its responses. However, in the 
majority of existing works, the extreme diversity of actors and agencies 
constituting the State is oversimplified by their placement into general categories 
such as strong State/weak State. This would suggest a concerted action on the 
part of the State. In such analysis, police forces and their actions are considered 
as pure instruments and are categorized under "police repression". The sole actor 
which the protesters confront is the government in power representing the State. 
This body, through the police, thus decides whether to increase repression or 
give way to the demonstrators’ demands. From a judicial point of view 
emanating from Weber, the police appears as an armed instrument of political 
power.
In this paper, we propose a model for ways in which protests are handled 
which presents street demonstrations as part of a triangular game in which the 
rules are prone to change during the course of the event. In effect, it can be 
argued that an understanding of the methods of protest management should 
include three major actors: the forces of law and order, the government, and the 
protesters themselves. The analysis constantly returns to the freedom of 
manoeuvre at the disposal of these actors in order to establish the rules of the 
game and then to actually act within them. This room for manoeuvre necessitates 
an examination of events as a result of a complex, interactive and tactical 
process incorporating the social movement, police officers (senior officers and 
rank and file) on the ground and political authorities. From this angle, our model 
differs slightly from that of Della Porta which emphasizes police knowledge and 
tactics. It is also different from the model proposed by Me Carthy, Me Phail and 
Crist (1995) which, in addition to police tactics, analyses the relationship 
between public order policy and the legal, political environment. In our view, 





























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
Taking this as a starting point, we explore three central questions: 1) What 
are the established rules of the game (legal norms, structure of police 
organization and professional conduct, hierarchical relations between police 
authorities and political authorities)?; 2) How, in practice, do the different actors 
play the game (by a strict or relaxed application, depending on the individual 
circumstances and vested interests at the time?); 3) What impact does the 
development of the game on any modifications of the rules. In other words, 
what determines modifications of the rules?3
Our work relies on three kinds of material: firstly, a series of formal 
interviews, conducted in Paris as well as throughout the countrywith the senior 
officers most frequently involved in the negotiating, planning and command of 
order operations; secondly, observation of numerous protest events and 
participation to the planning process of demonstrations in Marseille and Nantes; 
finally, a database of almost 5,000 protest events which occurred between 1979 
and 1989 in the cities of Marseille, Nantes, and Paris4. We have constructed this 
data from the national police archives (Fillieule, 1994). This database allows us 
to make a quantified corroboration of the police officers assertions. By this 
multiplication of sources and methods, we hope our conceptualization of protest 
policing will not be as impressionistic as ethnographic studies sometimes appear 
to be.
We begin by briefly pointing out what we consider to be the main 
organizational characteristics of the handling of protests in France: a highly 
centralised and unified framework, even if, in the purest French tradition, the 
case of Paris is quite unique (I). We then present the philosophy on which this 
maintenance of order is based. We will show the extent to which these effective 
rules of the game are based less on legal prescriptions than on actual informal
3 Since the development of an answer to this last question would lead us too far from 
the framework of this paper, we will not deal with it here. Suffice it to say that, historically, 
the constitution of police knowledge, police practices and legal tools to deal with 
demonstrations were mostly initiated as a reaction to the changing tactics of demonstrators 
(see 1893-98, 1934, 1968, 1990-93 as major examples). The fact that the demonstrators 
themselves led the way reinforces our argument that the analysis of protest handling must 
undertaken on three levels (see also Fillieule, 1995 b).
4 All protest events which occurred between 1979 and 1989 in Marseille (the second 
largest city in France) and Nantes have been fully coded and entered into the database. Only 





























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
practices (II). Thirdly, we will see how these rules of the game are applied in 
different ways on the ground, depending on the orders given by the government 
and the police perception of the groups involved (III).
Forces of law and order in France: A diverse but highly centralized model
For historical reasons which cannot be elaborated on here, the forces 
responsible for the maintenance of public order in France are both varied and 
numerous.5 There are military forces {gendarmes mobiles) and the national 
police force (specialized divisions of these and more general sections6). 
However, behind this diversity is hidden a highly centralized and uniform 
organization in terms of leadership, policy implementation and methods. This 
will be briefly illustrated in this section with reference to the organization of the 
specialized forces and the urban police in Paris as well as in the provinces.
The specialized forces
The specialized forces are firstly composed of the gendarmes mobiles, 
which come under the Ministry of Defense but are at the disposal of the 
Ministry of the Interior when used in operations for the maintenance of order. 
Secondly, the CRS (Compagnies républicaines de sécurité), drawn from the 
mainstream police forces, form part of these specialized forces.
The first characteristic feature of these forces is that they are composed of 
mobile units with a national jurisdiction. CRS and gendarmes mobiles squads 
rarely act in the area where they are actually based. Therefore, full mobility is 
a prerequisite for these squads.
Secondly, these specialized forces undertake specific training. Gendarmes 
and CRS follow regular training sessions in the form of simulated operations. 
One striking fact is that, despite the observable differences in the practical 
execution of the exercises and the superiority of technical norms at the disposal
5 Several works deal with this question. The most clear and updated analysis is 
Bruneteaux, 1993.
6 In addition to these forces of intervention are those of the intelligence service (the 
Renseignements généraux) whose task it is to provide the ground forces with all necessary 




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
of the gendarmerie mobile, the professional code of practice on which the 
training of the two types of forces is based, judging by the manual used in these 
sessions, is virtually identical.
The essential training in the maintenance of order is concentrated on a 
small set of simple rules. Whatever situation they are applied to (movements of 
units, charges, throwing tear gas, etc.), these rules are based on the necessity of 
a strong collective discipline and absolute respect for orders given by the senior 
officers. In effect, the CRS and the gendarmes mobiles must always act as 
complete units under the authority of their own senior officers. It follows that 
the training of the rank and file is relatively neglected, with the emphasis 
remaining on that of the senior officers.
Hence, the practical value of specialized forces is strongly linked to this 
unity of action. Examination of hundreds of written accounts of demonstrations 
in the CRS archives points to the fact that any division of units inariably results 
in a loosening of control exercised by the seniors. Consequently, situations arise 
where ordinary officers may resort to more unofficial strikes legitimized as 
statements of self-defence. Collective action of squads serves the purpose of 
restraining men to avoid their taking any initiative to personally deal with events 
which occur in demonstrations (hurling of missiles, insults, etc.). This collective 
action principle helps to develop a sense of solidarity amongst the forces.
Deployment of these forces follows orders from the Prefet who directly 
represents the Minister of the Interior in the provinces (départements). There is 
no legal limit to the use of these specialized forces. However, in practice the 
Prefets only resort to such measure when the information before them indicates 
that there is a strong possibility of violent/disruptive actions may break out in 
the course of an event. In all other cases, which cover the majority of events in 
the provinces, the local urban forces, under the authority of the local chief of 
police are responsible for maintaining order.
The civil authorities, that is the Prefet or Deputy Prefet (sous-préfet), the 
mayor or one of his associates and the police commissioner (commissaire1), are 
responsible for the use of coercive measures when considered appropriate. 
However, on the ground, the execution of policy legally depends on the 7
7 The term commissaire refers here to a person responsible for law and order, a civil 




























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
hierarchy of squads made available. Once the decision to use coercion is taken, 
with the orders given by the civil authorities, the heads of each squad can give 
orders and supervise the action of their men in the field.
This rational partition of labour, conceals however, a lack of clarity 
regarding the exact nature of the relationships between the orders given by the 
civil authorities from the command room or on the ground and the actual 
implementation of these orders by the chiefs of each squad. This lack of clarity 
can sometimes be magnified in important cases of maintaining order, given the 
wide range of forces which could intervene and the frequent interventions of 
political power in the technical decisions to be taken.
Even in Paris, there have been cases in which a commander of a CRS or 
gendarme squad has refused to execute an order from the civil authority which 
has not also been confirmed by his own superiors.8 In the light of these 
observations, it seems necessary not to reduce the interactions in demonstrations 
to a simple conflict between demonstrators and the police. Just as demonstrators 
can oppose each other, the forces of order do not necessarily act in a unified
8 Monjardet (1990, p. 219) says the same. Cf. equally the interview with Yves Lejeune, 
commandant of a CRS squad, before the commission of'inquiry of the National assembly in 
1986 regarding his relations with the hierarchy:
A. Billardon: 1 am struck by the problem of command in this operation. Under whose 
orders were you ?
- Y. Lejeune: Under the orders of the commissaire and possibly the operations room. (...) In 
theory, these are the same since the commissaire has instructions from the operations room 
on his own channel. And my boss, who is in the command room, gives me orders on his own 
line.
Gilbert Bonnemaison: If it happens that for a reason or other you have orders given by your 
boss which may not exactly be the same as that from the operations room, who should you 
follow?
Y.L: You are asking me a delicate question. That has never happenned to me.
G.B:You might find yourself before such a possibility.
Y.L: There are not many differences in points of view. I think at that moment I would make 
my own decision. It has previously been the case for police vehicles. Once the forces were 
in place, the commissaire of the XVI° arrondissemenl had asked, contrary to my opinion, that 
we reinforce the barricade with our vehicles. When 1 noticed that the demonstrators were 
trying to set fire to our vehicles, on my own initiative. 1 had them placed in the middle of the 
bridge. My vehicles pulled back. The other vehicles of the urban police which didn’t pulled 




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
way. There are no clearly defined structures governing the relationships on the 
ground - a state of affairs that could potentially result in disorder.
Urban police in the provinces and in Paris
As has been stated, specialized forces are only called in when the 
anticipated event is potentially violent or dangerous. Hence, for the majority of 
routine demonstrations, the urban police is the only force involved. In the 
provinces, the latter is characterized by two features: first, there is no specific 
training on the maintenance of order, either in the initial course or in susequent 
ones. Professional knowledge is only acquired by experience. Second, 
maintainance of order is just one aspect amongst others of their general duties. 
In certain large towns, there is however a special brigade called the Brigade 
Départementale d ’information de Voie Publique (BDIVP), whose police officers 
concentrate primarily on issues of public order.
Urban police officers undergo a nine-months initial training course in a police 
academy before being officially commissioned. This programm is quite limited 
and does not specifically deal with the maintenance of order. Reasoning 
underlying this situation is that the training of recruits explicitly aims to produce 
guardians of the peace in a general sense. The maintenance of order is a 
specialized police function which is taught to those whose careers subsequently 
develop in the CRS or in the Paris compagnies d ’intervention (see below). The 
absence of technical training for urban police is strongly emphasized by those 
who regularly organize demonstrations and they actually consider this to be 
dangerous:
"The urban police are the problem, in Paris and in the provinces. It is with them that 
we have all the problems, because they are not trained in how to maintain order. 
That’s what happened at Amiens when that guy was killed9.. It is always... It is those 
lads, when they charge they don’t know how to charge properly. They lay into people. 
That doesn’t happen with the CRS or the gendarmes".l0
9 This incident involved a CGT militant who died in Amiens following a blow received 
from a baton charge.





























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
In Paris, however, the young recruits are integrated into intervention squads 
(Compagnies d'intervention) which receive training in maintenance of order but are not a 
constituent part of the specialized forces (CRS and gendarmes). They equally assume 
numerous tasks related to anti-crime initiatives.
Created in June 1959 and extended to eleven units in 1969, the Compagnies 
d ’intervention benefited in the 1960s from a regular and very similar type of training 
programme to that of the CRS and the gendarmes. Then, from 1978, their role was extended 
to include an anti-criminality component. As a result, specific training for demonstrations 
diminished and finally disappeared. At the end of the 1970s, the number of squads was 
reduced to six and at the same time they were less and less frequently used as individual units. 
This development was reinforced in 1983 with the dispersal of these squads among the 
different police stations in Paris. There was thus a loss of technical expertise to the point of 
incompetence, with dangerous implications
For the training of the Compagnies d ’intervention, the model followed is that of the 
gendarmerie and the CRS. Training sessions are regularly held at an army location near Paris. 
In a few months, an advanced training centre should be completed and used in collaboration 
with the CRS".
This brief description of the different forces dealing with protest policing 
shows well how important the unification of the national context is in France. 
Apart from distinguishing Paris from the rest of the country - which is really 
only due to a question of political requirements - we can say without doubt that 
protest policing is exerted in a unified manner all over the country. Every 
aspects converges toward this unification : from the procedures for recruiting 
within the different forces, to the nature and quality of the training offered to the 
specialized units, the lack of such training for protest policing within the urban 
police, and the doctrine on which the training and the organization of the 
commandment are based. We could as well add to these points that all 
commissioners (commissaires) in charge of protest policing goes through the 
school of Saint-Cyr au Mont d’Or, where they receive an identical preparation 
for the maintenance of public order, and that information in Paris and out of 
Paris is collected by the same intelligence service (Renseignements généraux). 
The result is that a specific "philosophy of protest handling" has been built 
nationally in France, elements of this philosophy whcih may be found within
Direct cooperation between the Police Prefecture, Gendarmerie and CRS is not new 
in police training. For instance, all students at the school for the commissaires stay for a 
training session in Cigaville with the gendarmes. On the other side, CRS instructed the 




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
each police force and all over the country. We will now examine the essential 
characteristics of this "philosophy".
Fundamental Doctrine and Practice in Protest Policing in France
As P. Waddington (1994, p. 40) points out in his critique of the 
authoritarian State thesis, it would be completely misleading to base a complete 
explanation of the handling of protests solely on an analysis of the legal and 
material means at the disposal of political authorities. In France, the practice of 
protest policing is characterized precisely by the two following aspects: first, the 
continual search, through negotiation and compromise, for agreement even if 
such agreement is not necessarily based on the range of legal means; second, the 
underuse of available coercive means. On this point, the seniors officers we 
interviewed all agreed. This unanimity is confirmed in large part by our own 
observation of demonstrations. When we asked the chief of Etat-Major in the 
Paris Police Prefecture what he would consider successful protest management, 
he replied:
"An operation in protest management can be said to have succeeded when there have 
been no incidents, no injuries, or when it has been possible to engage a dialogue with 
the protesters right from the beginning and ensure a satisfactory conclusion to the 
demonstration. Demonstrators generally get much more tired than the policemen. We 
can always pull out one shift and send in fresh men. It is therefore best to take one’s 
time in bringing a demonstration to an end, and not, as 1 have seen happen on 
occasions, by kicking ass. We have to wait patiently for it to disperse. It is not always 
easy (...). A good demonstration is one in which neither the police nor the 
demonstrators find themselves in a position of inferiority."
The "philosophy" of protest policing can be summed up with the 
following three principles:
1/ The first objective of policing is to prevent trouble so that the police will not 
have to use force. Police Intelligence is therefore essential in formulating 
preventive measures;
2/ When police intervention is necessary to reinforce order, such intervention 
must not exacerbate the situation;
3/ Protest policing has as its primary objective the control of the situation at all 
times, regardless of costs. Predicting the events, constant negotiation with the 
other side, and control of the situation which is implemented by a wait and see 




























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
reactions are the three basic rules of the actual doctrine. We will examine 
therefore the meaning of these three principles and the way in which they are 
implemented.
The use o f Intelligence and planning in the maintenance o f order during 
demonstrations
Before the event, Intelligence and planning is an essential part of protest 
handling. According to most senior officers interviewed, failed policing above 
all occurs "when we are surprised. The worst thing that can happen is when we 
are surprised".
The Law of 1935 circumscribes the right of protest with an obligation on 
protesters to give the police three days notice of a march. This prior notification 
must be sent to the Town Hall or to the police headquarters in Paris. Even if the 
legal procedure is not strictly followed by the organizers of demonstrations (we 
will give more information on this point below), the police try to get in touch 
with the organizers to find out their intentions and to discuss the details of the 
march. At the same time, the intelligence service (Renseignements généraux ) 
produces a detailed report in which they provide their own information about the 
expected number of demonstrators, the aims of the march and the spirit of the 
protesters themselves. Based upon these elements, the local police chief (or the 
sub-director of public order in Paris) formulates a plan of action within the 
framework of the Prefet’s orders. The organization of the operation depends on 
two factors: the previous and/or declared goals of the demonstrators, and the will 
of the political authorities.
At this point, police headquarters determines the number of police officers 
required during the event. The Prefet approves the requisitioning of these men, 
from the local urban police (Compagnies d 'intervention in Paris) and, in the case 
of large or risky marches, gendarmes and/or CRS. After the national police 
headquarters have assigned all available forces, local police direction forms a 
plan of action consisting in the disposition of forces, the designation of senior 
officers (commissaires) who will lead these forces, and the requisitioning of 
specific materials (water tanks, anti-barricade trucks, etc.). This plan is 
established during one or more preparative sessions. On the day of the event, 
units gather one hour before the event is due to begin. In most cases, when CRS 




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
to the general plan and the objectives set by the Prefet at each point in the 
operation.
Of note is noteworthy the extent to which the police build their plans on 
past experience. We have, for instance, noticed that in Marseille, Nantes and 
Paris, in addition to the report given by the local intelligence service, those in 
charge of a specific protest policing conduct research from their own archives 
to look for past events of a similar nature. The purpose is to build on precedents 
to prevent the reoccurrence of unfortunate behaviour among demonstrators. This 
resort to past experience is a major element of the subculture of public order 
forces and can explain why all police forces specializing in crowd control try to 
produce as detailed written reports as possible about situations they have to deal 
with. These case studies form the main syllabus taught to trainee officers, and 
senior officers, at the school of Saint-Cyr au Mont d’Or for commissaires, in the 
training centres of the CRS or at the centre at Cigaville for gendarmes. In the 
same way, photographic or film records are often used.
Negotiation and compromise
The planning done before a demonstration is based in main part on contact 
with protest groups. Contrary to the commonly held assumptionthat the police 
have no contact with the organizers of a demonstration until the beginning of the 
march, most of the time the event takes place in a spirit of mutual recognition 
and respect. What we would like to show here is that in public order operations, 
the main way cooperation is secured through negotiation with the protest 
organizers, before as well as during the march. Moreover, we submit that this 
negotiation process relies more on informal means than on legal norms.
By far, the most illustrative example of this informal way of managing 
protests is that of the notification requirement contained in the Law of 1935. As 
noted above, this law requires notification to the police no less than three days 
before the intended date of procession. A march for which notification is not 
properly made and which refuse to disperse when asked by the police should be 
treated as an unlawful assembly. In such cases, the police are legally authorized 
to use force, and can arrest and prosecute the organizers as well as participants.
However, there is a gap between this legal framework and practice. It is 
extremely rare for organizers to comply with the law or even know its 
prescriptions, except in Paris where the principle of preliminary notification is 




























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
the rule, as illustrated by Figure 1 for Marseille. Only 8.5 per cent of the events 
recorded between 1987 and 1991 were notified to the police or the Town Hall. 
If the police were to bring the law into operation, French demonstrations would 
be for the most part considered as "unlawful assemblies" and would be strictly 
forbidden... As one can see, this is not at all the case.
{FIG 1 ABOUT HERE}
In the same way, it would be misleading to try to understand the way 
French political authorities deal with demonstrations simply by observing the 
changing legislative regime. The recent change in French law gives us a very 
clear example of this. Under pressure from the law and order lobby, the legal 
framework has recently been tightened during the course of the overall reform 
of the penal code initiated in 1994.
This might logically lead one to conclude that there has been a move 
towards greater repression in France. But that is not the case at all: the political 
reasons which prompted the passing of this set of laws are far removed from the 
reality of protest handling. This is confirmed by the interviews we conducted in 
July 1995 with the officers in charge of Parisian police. First, and this is quite 
surprising, these police chiefs only had limited knowledge of the new laws. 
Secondly, they all insisted on the theoretical aspect of these laws which could 
only be applied in the case of a very serious crisis:
"The new provisions are not well-suited to the task. The penalties were not applied 
before, so when one looks at the new ones they seem to be useless. Under these new 
regulations, we can lock up two- or even three-fifths of all demonstrations. And then 
we would have a real riot on our hands."
Protest policing cannot be adequately analysed in terms of the legal 
norms. As a rule, police do not use the whole set of legal means it has at hard 
to maintain order and the basis of its actions is essentially informal 
negotiation.12 The use of the declaration in Paris demonstrates the point.
In Paris, where prior notification of demonstrations is much more frequent 
than in the provinces, we can see that directors of public order, rather than for
12 We should keep in mind, however, that the eventuality of a crisis situation can lead to 




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
sticking to the strict provisions, look for establishing negotiations with the 
protesters. These negotiations must lead to a compromise so that unexpected 
risks are minimized. The Etat-Major considers this step as a central element in 
the means at its disposal and the Chief of the Etat-Major itself meets in his 
office with the people involved in the organisation of the demonstration. These 
organizers may have asked for the meeting or the police may have called them.
According to the chief of the Etat-Major, negotiation with demonstrators 
must fullfil the following requirements:
A) Requirements of (1) public order (for instance, police may prefer a 
specific route and refuse another) and (2) political considerations (that is, the 
orders of the Prefet) must never be presented to the demonstrators as flat 
requirements based on law: on the contrary, the goal of the negotiation is to 
make the demonstrators think that the restrictions are in their own interests, that 
it is simply friendly advice:
"If there is some small problem, perhaps with the route, I try to make them aware of 
it before they arrive at the Prefecture. So they can think about changing their route. 
If, for example, they want to go down the Champs-Elysées, this is not possible13. 
But rather than say to them that it is not possible, I would explain to them 
that they have to park 1,500 coaches, which is an enormous number. A 
coach is 20 metres long. You need dozens of streets in which to park 
them. They haven’t thought of that. So, I suggest to them Saint-Augustin, 
since they can park their coaches in the Boulevard Malesherbes, and so 
they agree and go away satisfied."
B) Organizers must always go away from the meeting with the feeling that 
negotiating helped them in organizing the march. That is why the chief of the 
Etat-Major presents his requirements in the form of helpful advice. For instance, 
in the case of inexperienced demonstrators, it is frequent for senior officers to 
give the organizers some instructions as now to organize stewards and how to 
direct them. In fact, police have an important advantage: they usually hold a 
monopoly of expertise, which they use to a greater or lesser degree to advise and 
assist organizers who are unfamiliar with practices and procedures. In doing so, 
they guide organizers along a path acceptable to the political authorities.
This is a tradition in Paris, for symbolic and practical reasons, that there are no 




























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
C) Police always act so that the organizers feel they hold the main 
responsibility for the demonstration. They ask about their stewarding and plans, 
pointing out to them all the potential dangers found at this kind of event (and 
even exaggerating). The goal here is to encourage the organizers to be as 
cooperative as possible and to ensure that they recognize the importance of the 
liaison officer who will be the link between the organizers and the police on the 
day of the event. But also, if the organizers fear from dangerous or violent acts 
from their own participants or some violent external groups (for instance, 
hooligans in student demonstrations), this encourages a shared interest between 
the police and the organizers and a shared perspective in relation to those who 
might be considered troublemakers.
D) Finally, the purpose of negotiation is to establish a climate of mutual 
confidence with the organizers being persuaded that the police will respect their 
undertakings. To fulfil this aim, the chief of the Etat-Major may reveal some 
part of the means at his disposal, in a spirit of openness, but also to exclude the 
possibility of ambiguous situations or surprises arising on the day the event takes 
place:
"My objective, when I meet with the demonstrators, is to ensure that they leave 
satisfied, even if they, have not got what they wanted. I never get angry with a 
protester, it is vital that they have total confidence in everything that happens. If I tell 
them to do something, I need it to be acted upon. I don’t want to say to them: ’Yes, 
you can do that’, and then, in the field, something else here happens. The fact that 
they have made a commitment by coming here, one is bound. They have their 
motives, but so what? They have the right to be received here like anyone else. If you 
start to have problems with them here, you will certainly have problems with them on 
the day".
Clearly, these four informal principles on which negotiations are based are 
applied to a greater or lesser extent according to the nature of the groups in 
question. The degree of cooperation can vary greatly. For instance, for the huge 
demonstration on 16 January 1995 in Paris in defence of state schooling (at 
which more than 800,000 people gathered), negotiations lasted more than a 
month. Police representatives directly assisted organizers during their internal 
meetings for the formulation of the stewarding plan, the organization of the 
march, and so on. In contrast, when demonstrators show no readiness to 
cooperate, and even refuse to meet with police face to face, the chief of the Etat- 
Major may content himself with a simple telephone negotiation, the route and 




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
After the preliminary negotiations, it is worth stressing how much the 
search for compromise influences the forces of law and order as events are 
actually taking place. To further this spirit of compromise a liaison officer is 
appointed for every protest, with the task of maintaining a constant contact with 
the organizers. During very large protests, he is always a senior officer of the 
Etat-Major.14 On the other hand, civilian police representatives are specifically 
charged with establishing contact between the organizers and the political 
authorities targeted by the demonstration is. These representatives lead the 
negotiation for example for the reception of a delegation at a public 
administration building and are in charge, if such delegation is permitted, of the 
group whilst inside the building and on the way out. These agents usually work 
in the different arrondissements (administrative districts of Paris), so they are 
perfectly familiar with the various heads (in each administration) who can 
receive a delegation. Negotiation with demonstrators is thus facilitated.
This process of constant negotiation in the field very often produces a 
close cooperation between police forces and demonstrators’s stewards, since they 
share common interests.
"If there is a procession of more than 800 metres, we must be able to isolate 
troublemakers from the crowd, and protect those that have a right to be there. This 
works very well with the CGT and other professional organizations. They have 
stewards in place who know that we will isolate those that shouldn’t be there. They 
will put up barriers and if necessary will stop the demo, speed it up or cut it short. 
Sometimes, they will come to us and tell us that they are going to lead the 
troublemakers up a certain street. And we can be waiting at the other end of the street 
to greet them! But for student demos, the stewards do not like to do that, because it 
is seen as collusion with the police. Some stewards at student protests even play a 
doublegame."
14 This practice certainly originates from the end of the 1970s, when the Police Prefecture 
in Paris generally opened large processions with police buses placed several hundred metres 
in front of the demonstration. It was during a demonstration of the steel workers on 23 March 
1979 that for the first time a police officer was in charge of the link. Otherwise, it is since 
the student demonstrations of december 1986 in Paris that this method has been systematically 
employed. It can sometimes be highly visible: during the annual demonstration of the National 





























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
"Once, I conducted a baton charge at the head of the CGT stewards. It was one of the 
1987 demonstrations in memory of Malik Oussekine,15 with many young people. The 
CGT was responsible for the stewarding. I was in charge of the coordination of the 
forces on the field. When we arrived in Place de la Bastille, the organizers came to 
me and said: "OK, our deal is over, we called for dispersion, good-bye." I said good­
bye to them and at that very moment, an unmarked police car was turned upside down 
and anarchists started in wreacking everything around them; a few dozen, not many 
more. So, I went back to the guy from the CGT and he told me: "Yes, but we called 
for dispersion." 1 said to him: "Listen, we have to do something." You know, even if 
there were some police units, the rest of the procession was still arriving. There were 
lots of young people. The guy from the CGT understood perfectly well that we could 
not do anything. It was a very delicate task, it was worse than bad. The CGT guy 
consulted his men. He asked the one he had to ask, and then he came back to me and 
said: "OK, let’s go." Then, with 20 big guys, we all together charged the hooligans. 
And I must tell you: they use means we gave up a long time ago. Everything was then 
back in order".
Here may bee seen one of the considerations which is most important for 
senior police officers; professionalism of the adversary. The more the organizers 
are used to the practice of a demonstration, the more senior police officers find 
it a "pleasure to work with them" (to use an expression often repeated in our 
interviews).16
In this analysis, we have shown that one of the major weapons of the 
police does not lie in a repressive or legalistic approach, but rather in the art of 
negotiation with the organizers, bringing them onto their home ground where 
they can keep the initiative and use their expertise to the full. However, this 
weapon would suffice if demonstrations only opposed senior officers and 
organizers. In other words, when the event is underway, the central problem 
becomes one of controlling troops - on the side of the demonstrators as well as 
on the side of the police.
Distance as a means o f control
15 A student who died as a result of the police beating during a demonstration on the 4 
December 1986.
16 Sommier (1990) presents the same point of view, based on interviews with chief 
stewards of the CGT and the CFDT: they usually recognize the police having a good 




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
"Two different obstacles stand against us in the field of protest policing. On the one 
hand, we find those who have organized and signed the preliminary notification. But 
the organizers have great difficulties when explaining this to their own constituency 
and it is exactly the same thing when we try to make it clear for police officers. An 
average demonstrator does not know that people come here and sign an official paper, 
that routes are negociated with us, that some manoeuvres are decided before the event 
begin: "When you get here, we’ll move this squad. Behind you, there will be this other 
unit. In front of you, a CRS squad will move ahead." The organizers know this. I tell 
them everything again when I get in touch with them. I tell them: "So, now, we want 
this, we let another squad stand behind you." But the rest of the march only see cops 
wearing helmets, who are ready to go. And our officers only sees people moving and 
shouting. We always have some difficulty explaining to them that demonstrations are 
a kind of a role game. It is a part of the urban ethology, and our two grassroots do not 
understand this very well".
This observation from the Director of training at the Paris Police 
Prefecture clearly demonstrates our point: the central issue faced by those 
responsible for the maintenance of law and order at protest events is that of 
control amongst the rank and file as well as the demonstrators. This distrust 
towards their own troops demonstrates how the doctrine of protest policing is 
largely based on the wish to avoid any confrontation between police officers and 
demonstrators. Protest policing in France is locked in a weighty contradiction 
expressed on the one hand by increasing pressure from the govemement and 
public opinion to control the demonstrations and, on the other hand, by what is 
still a main characteristic of police action, that is, whatever happens, "one is 
always hostage to the last legionnaire of the last century." In other words, protest 
policing is at the mercy of the weakest link17.
In the case of urban police, the question of control is even more important 
since the profession of "guardian of the peace" attracts a population of under­
motivated young people into its ranks, whose only wish is to move out of the 
rank of the unemployed. Furthermore, senior officers claim that new recruits do 
not stand up well to the various daily constraints of the job because their 
missions are completely incompatible with the romantic idea they had about the 
job before they joined the police force:
The Assistant of the Director of Public Security in Paris expresses it nicely in the 
following terms: "In the contemporary policing of protests, the Chief of Police, under pressure 
from Cabinet ministers and French press agency (AFP), tends toward a push-button response 





























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
"The main part of our men cannot even memorize the name of the Prefet. but they 
know all the names of the football players in the national team. Before, officers 
became officers from father to son or down through other relatives. They were mainly 
part sons of peasants or workers, and for them, to become a civil servant was 
perceived as a real social promotion. They were already socialized when they arrived 
in the Prefecture and they knew very well what the job was about: the kinds of 
missions, career plans, etc. Now, young recruits are from another world. They are not 
really motivated by the job but they cannot do anything else. The largest part of them 
join because of the pressure of joblessness. They come from the provinces and their 
one aim is to go back there. But what is of utmost importance is that they have no 
idea of the job they will have to do and what they imagine it will be is completely 
false. This image is in fact the one promoted by trash TV series like Starsky and 
Hutch. The young officer sees himself patrolling the streets all day long with no 
defined goal in a big car with a girophare, in regular clothes, and dealing with a big 
business every day... When they find themselves controlling traffic at intersections, 
they very quickly sing a different tune".
These comments help us to better understand why, in Paris in particular 
but also among the specialized forces those in command are wary of their rank 
and file. A veritable schism exists in effect between the goals of the police 
seniors and the way the rank and file think with regard to what constitutes good 
policing of protests. Non-intervention and an impassionate approach are two 
criteria for excellence in the senior officers’ view, but their men do not consider 
the operation a success without some kind of physical confrontation or without 
having evened the score with the demonstrators.
"You know, most of the time, when we are engaged in the policing of a protest, we 
do not confront demonstrators. If there is no violence, 1 think the officers resent it in 
a way that is - 1 will say it frankly - it’s desapointing. Because they wish to go for a 
battle. Some of them, however, more philosophically, think it is not worse like that. 
Policing of protests does not always mean baton charges, tear gas, beatings. That is 
what we try to explain to our young recruits. A lot of them think they are strong 
because they are numerous, and within a large force. Then, they would like... They 
would like... to be more violent. But we, on the other side, we watch over it. We just 
say: "stop!"
"The men always want to give a personal touch to the debate. One can often hear 
within the ranks before a baton charge: "I’m gonna kick that one, because he threw 
ten molotov cocktails." If one says: "We’ll arrest him", it is OK, but if he says: "This 
one, we’ll slash him on the corner of the bridge and then we won’t take him back", 
that’s another story. It is the duty of the commanders to listen to what is told and to 
draw aside those who started this kind of argument, which can lead to serious injured 




























































































Olivier F i ! lieu le and Fabien Jobard
litte problem. Finally, they made their film on their own. And the opposite is true, as 
well. The demonstrator who fix an officer in his memory because the officer is a little 
bit bigger. He fixes the poor little copper and he’ll receive his jab because he was on 
his own".
The concern to restrict the autonomy of policemen at the front line has 
increased in importance in recent years, notably after the student demonstrations 
of November and December 1986, during which one specialized motorcycle unit 
(Peloton Voltigeur Motocycliste -PVM) behaved in a particularity violent 
manner, one squad even going so far as to beat a demonstrator to death. This 
especially dramatic episode, in which the freedom of movement accorded to the 
field resulted in the death of a man, re-emerges time and time again in 
discussions among senior officers as a particularity tragic example of how a 
demonstration can go wrong when police officers are not well enough handled 
by their commanders:
"If only that team had kept on practicing every week in training sessions... It was a 
wonderful tool which, according to its initial objective, was supposed to be more 
dissuasive than repressive. It was created to be impressive, to go on the micro- 
phenomenas. It had an extraordinary mobility. So long as the guys were trained, so 
long as it was serious. Officers came from two distinct units: Compagnies 
d'intervention on one side and instructors on the other side. As long as the two were 
trained together and if the hierarchy followed everything, everything was OK. From 
the moment when the instructors began to think training was a useless constraint, that 
it just was not worthhile at all, because nobody told them what they had to do or 
nobody trained them seriously, they did their war on their own, in their own little 
territory."
To control the rank and file, a whole set of techniques, based on the idea 
of a necessary distance between demonstrators and officers, has been 
progressively developed. These various techniques are in a certain sense the 
action repertory for different interventions.
The main elements of this repertory are based on the use of specific types 
of action depending on the situation. Ideally, these responses aim to avoid 
physical harm to the demonstrators on each occasion and, at the same time, to 
allow the police officers to be protected and feel reassured.18 To achieve these
18 As all those interviewed recall, once fear takes hold within the ranks of the police, 
confronted by often large numbers of demonstrators, the risk of uncontrolled reactions 




























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
two objectives, the method employed concentrates on maintaining a necessary/ 
distance and on utilizing the ritualization o f aggression.
Ritualization of aggression and necessary distance are based on various 
means. In Europe, different methods, such as smoke screens, have been tried to 
this end. In France, the standard response is based essentially on the use of tear 
gas, and in a less systematic way, water tanks. As Bruneteaux notes, tear gas 
was employed for the first time in 1947 and became common place at the end 
of the 1960s. Following on from lacrimatory methods, gradation was introduced 
in the scaling of repression from 1955 with the invention of the offensive 
grenade, a missile designed to cause traumatic shock.
The use of water undoubtedly represents one of the oldest tools, in the 
form of deployment of firemen. Nevertheless, it was not until May 1968 that the 
first water tank model was employed to create a brief moment of crisis among 
protesters and force a no man’s land between them and the police forces so that 
all contact could be avoided.19
Ritualization of aggression is implemented by means of specific ways that 
present themselves to the demonstrators, move in the urban space, and make 
certain gestures policemen questioned referred to as rituals.
"The way we intervene, the way we take up our position, the way we, let’s say, play 
our own theatre, is very important. Because a perfect technical thing, but which is very 
badly shown off, which doesn’t make a sudden impression and which doesn’t show 
by certain signs our determination to lead the manoeuvre the way we want, can very 
quickly make the situation change. We have to visually display both our purpose and 
our determination. Sometimes, it is better to come down a little bit, to get a better 
position, even if it means things are going badly around us. It is better if there is some 
trouble for 3 or 4 minutes and if, very firmly, from the very moment we show the will 
to clean the place, we position ourselves so that we show we are about to go into 
action. Very often, it allows us to avoid aggression. When we take up positions in a 
strong way, visually, we can see that the most part of the people who began to be 
violent, leave and we don’t see them anymore."
"The purpose of the training is to be able to carry out very compact and uniform 
manoeuvres in order to give the impression of a large force. Gendarmes have
19 Following a nurses’ demonstration during which water tanks were used without any 





























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
understood this very well for a long time: they slash their shields, a ritual, a gesture 
quite like the ones animals use. I often compare it to Konrad Lorenz’s books. It is the 
same with the demonstrators. Shouting, colours. It is just like Sioux war paintings. 
And on our side, we answer with another kind of gestual. Wearing helmets, putting 
our vizors down, beating the shields, letting the men progress in a line or in a column. 
We all know this. But it is rather difficult for our men to understand it".
When all other means of intimidation fail and it is no longer possible to 
maintain a line, senior officers have recourse to the baton charge. In the thinking 
of the police commanders, this is the ultimate means at disposal, in the sense 
that it is used only when confrontation with the demonstrators is absolutely 
necessary.20 But it should also be noted that in many cases, the baton charge 
is considered as a means of intimidation whose function is to leave the 
demonstrators untouched but, in the two senses of the word, to force a no man’s 
land which prevent man-to-man contact. The charge with baton drawn and the 
use of coercive means against demonstrators, according to the doctrine, is 
considered as the last resort.
Differentiation in the management of protesting groups.
Over and beyond a general doctrine of policing protests that would be 
theoretically applicable to all situations, both field observation and analysis of 
police archives clearly show that protest handling styles are very evidently 
determined by three interconnecting factors: differential police perceptions of 
protest groups, political considerations, and the strategy of protest groups 
themselves. In this third and final section we will argue that to understand actual 
policing styles, each event must also be analyzed in terms of a three-way 
interaction involving government officials, security forces and demonstrators 
themselves.
While protest handling is a technique (oriented by a doctrine) materialized 
by a set of practices (the determinants of which are to be sought in police 
perceptions of the groups in conflict), it is also a policy in the sense that it 
involves choices made within the framework of a government strategy 
(Monjardet, 1990). For this reason, we will now examine how, in addition to the 
organizational and technical elements analysed above, protest handling poses a 
number of problems that can be interpreted on a cultural and political level.





























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
A differential perception o f conflict groups
The doctrine of protest handling as it is taught does not confine its scope 
to delineating tactical and strategic methods inherent in police work. It inevitably 
develops an ideology as well. To the extent that policing protests implies 
resorting to force in other words, striking citizens while going to great lengths 
to assert they are not enemies - it is hard to avoid developing a normative 
philosophy to rationalize the practices adopted.
This normative philosophy, employed to justify the use of force, is 
basically built upon a declaration of impartiality, well expressed by the excerpt 
below from a memorandum in which the national training bureau of the CRS 
defines the missions of this specilized force:
"The CRS should not only be an intervention force but an interpositing 
force (a median and a mediator) playing the role of a buffer, thus 
participating in controlling social life. This deontology, by preventing a 
conflict from degenerating or avoiding extensive property damage or even 
the loss of human lives, allows the various actors in the economic and 
social sphere as well as political leaders when it comes to State 
intervention, the time to arbitrate, to find a solution to the many tensions 
engendered by the complexity of modem society".21
While claiming that police intervention takes place within the law of the 
republic and admitting the legitimacy of protest action, demonstrations are 
analysed through the very peculiar prism of crowd psychology handed down 
through the works of Tarde and Le Bon. The resulting conception of the 
demonstrator consequently appears, in our opinion, first to justify the patience 
police are asked to exercise in the event of an assault or property damage, then 
to legitimize the use of strong-arm tactics when the civil authorities have 
decided to call for intervention or in situations of self-defence.
This is why anticipation, throwing projectiles and hurling insults are at 
first tolerated by men who have been conditioned to believe they are dealing 
with children or at least "people who have taken leave of their senses." But at 
the same time, and this is not contradictory, this vision of things contains the 
principle justification for intervention, both because the irresponsible crowd has
21 In Notice pratique sur les conditions d'emploi des Compagnies Républicaines de 




























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
become dangerous and because in its midst are leaders that have to be 
neutralized. Commissioner Berlioz (1987) aptly expresses this conception when 
he writes that an angry crowd "is obviously dangerous, because the individual 
feels liberated. The slightest slogan, even the most unreasonable one, is instantly 
taken as a primal truth and acted upon without reservation. The intransigence 
and intolerance of this mass preclude all discussion and negotiation; thus the 
only solution open to someone in charge of public order is to check the eruption 
of this crowd before it is too late" (p. 13). The predominance among police 
cadres as well as men in the ranks of a type of reasoning inspired by crowd 
psychology might lead one to conclude that their vision of protesting crowds is 
an undifferentiated one. This is not so in reality.
Notwithstanding the official line of the law, which holds that every 
demonstrator has the right to equal treatment, it has become clear through both 
studying demonstration reports and conducting interviews that police officers 
always pass an implicit judgement on the demonstrators’ legitimacy, according 
to the perceived characteristics of the protest organization:
"In some cases people are desperate. I’ve seen some who had come from little 
provincial towns like that. That’s desperation, when the factory is closing down. It 
happens when the whole town depends on practically one single business. Or worse, 
when two spouses work in the same company. For people like that it’s a disaster 
because they won’t find another job. They haven’t got much else to lose and you can 
understand why they resort to violence. You’ve got to understand."
These differential perceptions obviously play a role in the type of strategy 
implemented by the police force. Again Monjardet’s analyses (1988) on the 
professional ideology of the CRS are enlightening. In his view, the attitude of 
the CRS "depends on the demonstrators’ behaviour and very directly on the 
tension they themselves display. It also depends, in a different way for each CRS 
member, on the nature of the demonstrators: their social characteristics, the types 
of demands." This allegedly leads to "a certain sympathy for workers’ demands 
and a certain aversion regarding young-privileged-student-senseless-looters" (pp. 
101-126).
Protest handling under high political surveillance
Differential police perceptions of demonstrators are not enough to explain 
differences in styles of protest handling. Political involvement has yet to be 




























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
force is always the result of a decision on the part of the administrative 
authorities (the Prefet). This state of legal subordination suggests that we should 
examine both the instructions given by the civil authorities and how they are 
implemented in the field. We will first see that the intransigence displayed at 
times by the political authorities makes the outbreak of violence highly 
probable.22 Conversely, government representatives sometimes handle conflicts 
in a patrimonialistic manner. The methods and justifications of this policing style 
remain to be explored.
The case in which security forces, on orders from the civil authorities, 
most clearly take a repressive attitude toward demonstrators is during illegal 
demonstrations not tolerated by the government. For example on 30 November 
1988, opponents to the Turkish government planned a demonstration to protest 
Turgut Ozal’s visit to Paris. Although it was banned by the Prefet, a meeting 
was planned at Place de la Concorde in front of the Hotel Crillon to boo Turgut 
Ozal, official guest of France. Security forces had strict orders from the 
government to prevent any gathering at the Concorde and to make arrests. As 
early as 10 a.m., small groups of demonstrators were coming out of the metro. 
Soon some 30 people were gathered near the obelisk. The CRS commandant 
then received orders to proceed with arrests, which he refused to do for want of 
means (lack of buses). A half-hour later the protester numbered about 200: the 
security force moved to scatter them and the first clashes begin (the 
demonstrators were cerrying batons). About 50 arrests were made. At 10.25 a.m. 
the remainder of demonstrators, who were crouched down to avoid being carried 
off, were ordered to disperse. The security force intervened by blocking the 
demonstrators against the fence surrounding the obelisk which allowed the 
officers to make arrests in greater numbers. During this operation tear gas was 
used (even as far as in the buses) to neutralize the most virulent demonstrators. 
A withdrawal manoeuvre initiated by the CRS then allowed the crowd to 
disperse along the Quai des Tuileries. At 10.45 a.m. it was all over. The CRS 
counted 14 wounded among their ranks; one demonstrator, "suffering from the 
effects of tear gas, fainted and was taken by civilian prefecture staff over to the 
obelisk fence and handcuffed to it until the first aid team arrived", states the 
CRS report. Numerous arrests must have taken place as several prefecture 
vehicles were sent out.
22 This has been already suggested by Skolnick (1969, p. 47). See also Waddington 





























































































Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard
This example provides a perfect illustration of the difference in treatment 
that demonstrators receive depending on the instructions given by government 
authorities: given the orders to disperse immediately, police intervention 
preceded any demonstration of violence ; in contrast with most protest policing 
operations, the aim of the manoeuvre was less to disperse the demonstrators than 
to make arrests. Therefore, the blocking of opponents against the fence around 
the obelisk, a behaviour about which the CRS itself expressed reservations given 
the violence it sparked; the warnings were issued only after an initial effort to 
drive the crowd back and some 50 arrests were made; finally plain-clothes 
officers from the prefecture were there to filter the press so as to avoid too much 
publicity.
Another typical method of direct political involvement in the policing of 
demonstrations, although unfortunately little research has been devoted to it, is 
antagonism. The alleged existence of agents provocateurs has been the focus of 
many debates in France, either put forth as an argument for propaganda purposes 
or denounced as a cause of violence when trying to establish the facts, 
depending on the case. However, as G. T. Marx points out (1974), the sociology 
of mobilizations and police specialists have scarcely taken an interest in the 
phenomenon, despite its blatant existence: indeed, historical examples abound 
and in his article Marx studies some 20 cases in the United States. In France, the 
matter of antagonism resurfaces periodically, the most striking cases in recent 
years being the steel-workers’ demonstration on 23 March 197923 and the lycée 
student protest on 12 November 1990.
Deliberate antagonism on the part of political authorities is most often at 
the expense of the police themselves, who iterate their hostility to the orders 
given. Rather than speak of police antagonism as is usually the case, it would 
thus be more accurate to speak of political antagonism. For the 12 November 
1990 demonstration, for instance, the Prefet authorized the young protester to 
cross the Seine river and disperse along the Champs-Elysées. It also set up a 
large concentration of troops on the right bank, leaving the left bank relatively 
unattended. The general staff unanimously expressed its disapproval based on 
technical reasons. But no charge to the plans were allowed. The result concurred 
with police predictions: the first incident of pillaging finally prompted the 
prefect to prohibit the march from crossing the Seine, provoking a fury among 
the mass of demonstrators. Furthermore, the operation was set up in such a way




























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
that the police had immense trouble holding down the bridges. The 
demonstration ended in several hours of violent clashes, considerable property 
damage and some hundred wounded.
Though certain social groups or demands probably receive more severe 
treatment than is usually the case, in certain circumstances political authorities 
show greater tolerance toward illegal protest activity. Most cases involve 
farmers’ demonstrations, and to a lesser degree, students’.
On the most transparent level, political authorities issue orders not to make 
arrests, even when individuals who have perpetrated violence can be identified. 
This is particularly to avoid refulling protest dynamics. Rather unconvinced of 
the efficacy of this method, security forces often complain of government 
leniency, the effect of which, in their opinion, is more to assure the protest 
group of the utility or even the necessity of violent action.
Variations in the degree of tolerance shown by the civil authorities are 
manifest in other instances as well. It is not uncommon, as we have seen, for 
"zones of tolerance" during pre-demonstration negotiations between organizers 
and the authorities, to be defined, the purpose of which is to circumscribe 
beforehand the type and degree of violence that will not give rise to police 
intervention. These are the negotiation procedures with political authorities that 
we have shown to have crucial repercussions on police operations. Delimiting 
degrees of acceptable illegality fulfils a dual function. It first allows the civil 
authorities to define acceptable targets for violence and to reject others deemed 
more sensitive or costly, for instance, public buildings, private property, ans so 
on. At the same time it does not cut off the organizers from its popular base, 
sometimes determined to see some action no matter what, and thus allow us the 
leadership to maintain control.
In other cases, an agreement is found in the field without prior negotiation 
having taken place. For instance, when on 19 May 1983 poultry farmers 
scattered 17,000 laying hens in the streets of Morlaix before charging City Hall 
where they broke down doors and occupied the premises, the authorities offered 
to put a train carriage of the Brest-Paris express at the disposition of a 
delegation (and their chickens) to go to Paris and request a meeting with a 
Cabinet member. The farmers’ acceptance of this compromise enabled a clash 
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C o n clu s io n
To conclude, we wish to underscore the importance of the communication 
process in protest interaction. This communication can be analysed as an 
insurance game, that is, an exchange in which the action depends on anticipating 
the adversary’s next move: demonstrators adjust their acts in accordance with 
what they believe the police will tolerate, while civil authorities implicitly or 
explicitly set tolerance thresholds depending on the nature of the protagonists. 
The figure below outlines this mechanism by identifying four ideal-types of 
protest styles.
F ig u re  1: Id ea l-ty p e s  o f  p r o te st  sty le s  in F ran ce
p o lice  sty le  (p o ss ib ly  u n d er  p o litica l p ressu re )
peaceful/ cooperation violent
peaceful /  peaceful non tolerated
cooperation demonstrations A demonstrations B
a c tio n  o f  the
d e m o n stra to r s  violent patrimonialistic crisis
handling C demonstrations D
Type B covers situations in which the police, on orders from the political 
authorities or their own chief, have a distinctly repressive and/or antagonistic 
attitude toward non-violent demonstrators. Most banned and non-tolerated 
demonstrations fall into this classification.24 Type C considers situations in 
which the authorities handle illegal protests in a soft manner. The police take a 
wait-and-see stance with regard to public and private property damage. Type D 
characterizes demonstrations in which protester and security force commanders 
alike adopt a position of open conflict. Finally, Type A refers to routine 
demonstrations that follow the procedures outlined above and which take place 
in a climate of mutual cooperation. Our paper demonstrates that, apart from a 
few exemplary cases, differences in policing conflicts do not fall neatly into
24 We know that the interdiction of a demonstration is no longer a sufficient reason to 
provoke a systematic dispersion. There must be a political decision taken by the authorities. 




























































































The Policing of Protests in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing
these four categories. We have in fact shown that attitudes during a 
demonstration are in constant flux and, for instance, a demonstration being 
handled according to the soft method as long as protest violence remains within 
certain bounds can turn into an open clash and the dispersion of the protester as 
soon as security forces implement repressive methods. The above grid serves 
only to stress the fact that the way the authorities — be they in the political 
arena or the police in the field -— perceive protest groups, and thus the treatment 
the latter receive, is obviously not uniform.
The main reason for this is that government authority as it is manifested 
in protest handling is brought into action through a multitude of actors, the 
interests, the subcultures and the attitudes of which vary greatly. Police handling 
of protests can therefore not be interpreted solely according to a logic of pure 
instrumentality of the security forces in the service of political choices, given the 
leeway agents at all levels are granted. We thus logically conclude that there is 
a need to analyse the police machinery as a fully fledged actor in the structure 
of political opportunities. Yet it would be misleading to concentrate attention on 
police work alone and no longer take into account the role of political authorities 
or the nature of protest groups. Only a combination of these three angles can 
enable us to identify a series of factors that can be said to play a role in the type 
of protest handling style implemented.
Olivier Fillieule
European University Institute, Florence 
Fabien Jobard
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